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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L.\ WlUJNCE W. BROWN, 
Plain tif !-Respondent, 
vs. 
FRED .JOHNSON and 





S'I' A T.K'.\I OF KIND OF CASE 
f'I ai 11 tiff';; action for damage;; for personal injuries 
i'lr·11n1·cl in rear-ewl eollision. 
DCSPOSI'l'ION IN LOWER COURT 
'I'li0 jury returned a vcrcliet of no cause of action 
in the t'i mt trial. 'I'he court, .Judge MarcPllus K. Snow 
'itling-, g-ra11ted plaintiff's rnotiou for a new trial. In 
1 lie o;r•r·ond tria I, liefon• .J uclge Leonard "'· giton, the 
.imy rdurned a \'l'l'(lid for the plai11tiff in the amount 
11!' $1 l ,/00.00. 'l'hr• defondmits' motiou for a new trial 
11 ;\-; <if'lliPrJ. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff prays that the judgment entert<I. , ,, 
the jury verdict in the second trial be affirmed. 
STATE:i\IENT OF FACTS 
The collision, giving rise to this claim, occurred in 
Emigration Canyon on January 11, 1968. The plaintiff, 
a student at the University of Utah, was proceeding in 
a westerly direction when struck from the rear by the 
defendant Johnson driving a Royal Baking Company 
truck. Johnson, a route salesman for the bread eom-
pany, had been a commercial driver for 20 years antl 
had driven the canyon route more than 1,000 times ( R 
767-769). The agency of the defendant Johnson was ad-
mitted (R. 230). 
Prior to the collision the l1efendant J olm:-;011 1rn' 
following the plaintiff, before attempting a passillg 
maneuver, at a distance of from 15-20 feet (R. 798, Sel'-
ond Trial, R. 418) on icy, snowpacked roads (R. 773-774) 
at a speed of 30 miles per hour (R. 790). No 
stop was made before the collision (R. 790) and no horn 
was sounded (R. 795). The passing maneuver was at-
tempted at the most densely populated area iu the cau-
yon (R. 786-787). The defendant admitted that he was 
"tailgating" the plaintiff (Second Trial, R. 421) ancl that 
he was "too close" (Second Trial, R. 422). 
When the def eudant attempted to pass the plain-
tiff, his front wheels were on the passing lane, almost 
to the plaintiff's back wheels, while his back wheels, or 
2 
11Jlf' of' them, were still in the right-hand or west bound 
!,'JI<' of I raffi(' (R. 781, 79J). Observing the plaintiff's 
iirnk1· lights come on the first time, the defendant at-
tempted to pull back into the westbound lane without 
,·ornpleting the passing maneuver (R. 781). Upon pull-
ing hack in line, the defernlant 's truck was following 
the· plClintiff at a distance of from two to three feet 
( R. 784). When the plaintiff braked a second time, the 
('()llision occurred. The plain tiff did not cross the center 
line ( R. 789) and the defendant could have uninterrupt-
edly continued his passing maneuver, but for the fear 
tl1at tliP plaintiff would skid 011 the slick roads, (R. 789), 
<11· tn!'ll left, (R. 781). The plaintiff gave no left-tum 
:-ilrnal (H. 784). There was no place to make a left turn 
for a su hstantial distance from the point where the col-
;j,ion on·mTed (R. 783). 
l'rior to the collision the plaintiff was proceeding 
<lmrn Emigration Canyon at a speed of 20-23 miles 
JH·r l1our (R_ 774). Rounding a curve, he observed a 
clllal! puppy walking along the side of the roadway 
I J; .. -1.-11) "·ltieh turned as if to cross (R. 547). The 
)'Lli11tiff brnked, slowing to approximately 10 miles per 
l1our ( H. 347). Then, to avoid striking the puppy, the 
)'lniutiff slowed his ,·chicle a second time to approxi-
fin• milPs per hour (R. 548). The brake lights 
1amp on two separate times prior to the impact (R . 
. 181) with a tim0 interval hetwe0n. The impact oc-
1·un1·d wltilP tl1v plaintiff's Yehirle was still mo\"ing, as 
1111• plaintiff, hi,; foot off the hrake, prepared to ac-
<·<·ln;i(p (H. :i-18). 
3 
The 1·ecord shows that the dcfcm1ant was 
the plaintiff at a distance of 200 f ePt ( R. 776) on curwd 
mountain highway; that thP plaintiff had lookc>rl 'l\t 
the rear view mirror on thP way down thP canyon wit/i. 
out observing the defendant (R. 549); and that his at-
tention was on the puppy when the impact occurred 
( R. 552). Th0 weather was cold and the road was ro1·-
ercd with ice and snow (R. 5:JO). 'l'hc plaintiff's win-
dow was rolled up and there was no time to give a hand 
signal (R. 551 ). The defendant admittNl that he oh-
sen•ed the plaintiff's lirakP lights lit on two separatl' 
occasions. (R. 781). 
FA<'TS 
The plaintiff, an outstanding wn•stler (R. :J38-3G7). 
was taken to the U nivcrsity Hospital 011 the day the 
collision occurred. The initial examination showed ten-
dernC>ss in the cerYical spine, pain with motion, a!J(l 
muscle spasms (R. 61:-l). A preliminary diagnosis, basC'1l 
primarily 011 the x-ray findings, determined that the 
plaintiff had suffered a subluxation (partial incomplete 
dislocation) of the 4th and 5th cenical vertebrae (R. 
614-615) and an avulsio11 fraeture of tlw 2lHl c<•rvieal 
vertebra (R. 616). 
Subsequent x-rays show0d a deerease in the height 
of the 4th and 5th, a11d 3th and 6th wrtebral bodies (R. 
620). Other symptoms of a ruptured disc i11cluded a 
decrease in sensation in the area supplied the iitli 
and 6th cervical nerves, as WPII as a deerease in scnsa-
4 
11t111 111 tli<· bic·c•p,; reflex (R. G19). The latter symptoms 
\\ ,., ,, 11c·u rological findings, ohjecti\·ely diagnosed, which 
\ ic/1'1, •·il 11en·e injnry (R. 620) . 
. \Yt1•r additional examinations and x-ray findings, 
ti;•· tn·<1ting physician concluded that the plaintiff had 
n rnpt un•d disc (R. 620). The doctor testified that 
tl1erc W<ts soft tissue im·olvement and ligamentous <lam-
(H. 6-1-3). Approximatc•ly eleven months after the 
i11,iury, tlw Plaintiff was having tension headaches, re-
qniri11g medication, and suffering the effects of trau-
ni;1tie arthritis (H. G4-l-, 64:i-G-l-G). 
'l'l1c• plaintiff's ph>·sieian testified that it would be 
i11a1h·i"alile for the plai11tiff to fnrtlH•r participate in 
<·11ntc1d sports, including wrestling (R. 649); that he 
li<1d <t :;o 1wr ce11t permanent partial disability of the 
1·1,n·ieal spi11e and a 10 per cent permanent partial dis-
11 l1ilit:• of the total body as a result of the collision (R. 
Tl11· :21->·enr-olcl plaintiff required complete rest for 
fr\<' ,,.l'l'k, \1·on• a cen·ieal collar for five months, and 
],,,,t t 1rn quartPrs of school and eleven weeks work. 
1'l1C' defendants dicl not contend that the plaintiff's 
i1Jjuric·s had any pre-existing cause (R. 584). Although 
1]1,. rn1·diral fads "'l'l'l' disputed h>· tlw defendants, each 
rd' tl1<· dodors found substantial injun» (See summary 
111· rn1·di<'<il te,;timo11y, plaintiff's mgument, R. 483-488). 
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AR GU l\l ENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The defendants' brief concluded that the jury nr. 
diet in the first trial was supported by substantial evi-
dence. It presumed that the jury correctly weighed 
controverted evidence and that there was no misappli-
cation of the law which operated to cause a miscarriagl' 
of justice (Apps. Brief, 21). The granting of a new 
trial, the defendant argued, \ms an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. 
These arguments were considered in part by .Jus-
tice \Volfe in K i11g r. enion Pacific R. R. Co., 117 rtah 
40, 212 P.2d 692.1 'l'he trial judg·p in the King case con-
tended that certain evidence was "uncontroverted." 
This court did not agree. "However," said Justice 
\Volfe, " ... it is not necessary that the ei·idence bP 
uncontroi·erted in favor of the moving party before the 
trial court can .IJrant a new trial." (Emphasis added). 
Further, the evidence before the court in the King casr 
was sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff or 
the defendant. The court concluded that where com-
petent evidence would support a ,-erdict for the plain-
tiff, "Nothing more need appear." Most importantly, 
1See also: Williams v. Ogden Union Ry. and Depot Co. (Utah) 
230 P.2d 315, citing the King case. The trial court granted the defendant 
a new trial after the jury had returned a verdict for the Thd 
court affirmed where " ... there was competent evidence which woul 
have supported a verdict for the defendant." 
6 
;, cont• 1st to the defendants' argument in the instant 
<'ilS<', th<' eourt conrlude<l that, 
''The defendants contention that a trial 
judge in most cases should not grant a new trial 
1l'hen the verdict is supported by substantial com-
petent evidence cannot find support in the au-
thorities." (gmphasis added) 
\Yen' this not so, as this court has noted else-
''"here,' the court's function with respect to weighing 
the Pvidence would be limited to interfering only when 
it required to do so as a matter of law. 
Stack r. Kearnes, 118 Utah 237, 221 P.2d 594, posed 
a set of procedural facts on appeal nearly identical to 
tliose in the instant case. In the Stack case the plaintiff 
at the first trial received a verdict of no cause of action. 
Plaintiff's counsel then made a motion for a new trial 
ll'hieh was granted by the trial court. The second trial 
n·:·mlted in a Yerdict for the plaintiff which was then 
<l]Jpealed on the theory that the action of the trial court 
iu granting the new trial constituted an abuse of dis-
ndio11. Four grounds had been cited as supporting 
plaintiff's motion for the new trial, the two most prom-
inent of which were the insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict and the rlaim that the verdict was 
against the law. 
The trial court in the Stack case did not specify the 
or grounds upon which it based its order. The 
cl<'fc·1Hia11t in Rt<1ck contended that the ground upon 
'See concurring opinion, Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 
P.2d 722. 
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which the plaintiff relied m argument, which appar-
cntly influenced the court in reaching its conclusion, 
was that the evidence was insufficient a11d the verdid, 
therefore, contrary to law. 3 This was denied by the 
plaintiff. 
This court affirmed the decision of the trial court 
to grant a 11ew trial, assuming that the basis for the 
court's decision was, as conh•rnlcd hy the dc>foll(lant, 
the single ground that the eYidence \\·as insufficient to 
justify the verdiet. The court, eiting King v. Uniu11 
Pacific R. R. Co., supra., stated simply that, 
" ... where there appears in the record com-
petent evidence which would support a verdict 
in favor of the party mo\'ing for a new trial, 
there is no abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial court in granting a iww trial upon that 
ground." (i.e. the insufficiency of the evidence)' 
"Note that this was the plaintiff's argument in the instant case and 
that the defendants denied that "insufficiency of the evidence," without 
more, justified setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial. (Apps. 
Brief, 6, 10). 
•See concurring opinion, Holmes v. Nelson, mpra, cited by appel-
lant (Apps. Brief, 10), where Justice Crockett comments that the prior 
decisions of the court, 
" ... reflect the sound principle that the matter (i.e. the granting 
of a new trial) should rest pretty much within the sound discretion 
and good conscience of the trial judge. Supponing this view is 
the fact that Rule 59(a), giving the court power to grant new trials 
for insufficiency of the evidence, must impart something more than 
the mere authority to do so when the proof is so lacking that there 
should have been a directed verdict. In the latter instance it is the 
court's imperative duty not only to set aside the verdict but to dis· 
miss the action. Therefore, if any meaning is to be given to the 
provision that a new trial may be granted for insufficiency of _the 
evidence it must mean something more than the obvious duty JUSt 
referred to, i.e. it must repose some discretion in the trial court to 
grant new trials for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the ver· 
diet, even where there is more than the amount necessary to make 
out a prima facie case." 
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Tl 1 i" coll rt lias consistently acknowledged the 
"lirnad'' 11isnetion of the trial judge with respect to 
ii:· or dc•nial of ue\\" trials. The trial judge's 
rnlillg 011 such motions should i10t be overturned unless 
it ;1ppc•ar:-; that it was "arbitrary," or that it "clearly 
transgressed any rcasonahlc hounds of discretion,'" or 
ili t Ji c· ;i] i:-;01ire of "plain a husP. "'' Furthermore, the test 
;tpjili('rl !1as a ''l1igh dcgTl'C of sul1jcdi,·e content'" where 
1 lic· 1 rial .irnlg<' is concenlC'cl and must, on review, con-
,;id<'r hi,.; "acln111tagecl'' position "with respect to the 
trial."' 
< ln this appeal, the evidence is viewed most favor-
;1liJ:-· to tlw plaintiff." Applying the ahove principles, 
it is an iucontestable fact that there is sufficient evi-
d1•11c"' 011 tlw n•conl to support a venlict for the plaintiff. 
'l1l1c· findings of the jury in the first trial were 
against tlw weight of the evidence and the judge 
1·ould not, in g-ood conscience, permit them to stand. 
···Hyland v. St. Marks Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736. Cited 
i1' Appellant's brief at page 7. 
'·Holmes t'. Nelson, supra. 
7/d. 
'See Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 359, 366 P.2d 791, where the 
court stated, 
"However since the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses and 
had a first hand view of all the evidence, and the proceedings 
throughout the trial and has ruled on the admissibility of evidence, 
and instructed the jury on the law governing their verdict, and had 
opportunity of observing the tactics of the counsel throughout the 
trial and the jury's reaction thereto, his ruling on a motion for a 
new trial should not be overruled unless it clearly appears that he 
has abused his discretion." 
"S1<1ck '" Kearnes, supra at 595. 
9 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
FAILING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANTS' 
PROFFERRED INSTRUCTION NO. 21. 
The defendants contend that the trial court erred 
in failing to instruct the jury not to consider damages , 
for any disability or expense related to future surgery, 
Plaintiff responds as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff Waived Any Claim for Such 
Damages. 
It is true that the plaintiff's physician described 
the procedure required for the repair of a herniated disc. 
'rhe plaintiff did not, however, present evidence at the ' 
second trial bearing on the value of hospital and med. 
ical expenses, or lost earnings, if future surgery was 
required. Such evidence was, over stringent objection, 
admitted at the first trial (R. 632-636). Failure to pre· 
sent such evidence a second time was, in effect, a 
'vaiver by the plaintiff of any claim for damages rc·-
lated to future surgery. In closing argument, plaintiff's 
counsel waived any claim for the value of delayed school-
ing; for future medical expenses, and for wages and 
expenses re la tecl to future surgery ( R. 491). 
B. Tl1e Instructions as Given By The Court Arif· 
quately Protected the Interests of the Defendant. 
The accumulated instructions of the court ade-
quately defined the jury's responsibilities (R. 215-253). , 
They discussed proximate cause, preponderance of evi-
10 
ii.''!<'<', and lmnlen of proof (R. 218, 219, 221). They di-
, •1 ,. • .[ that no verdict could be based upon speculation 
or cunj<'(·ture (R. 222) and expressly cautioned that the 
j 11 ry could not award speculative damages, meaning 
damages which, "althougli possible," were "remote, 
1·1111.i<'ctnrnl, or spreulativr." (R. 237) (Emphasis added). 
Tlie eomt imlicated that the jury was not bound by the 
11pinio11s of C'xpert witnesses, and that it could reject 
,nch opillions if they were unsom1d (R. 243). Last of 
all, the court required that the damages for doctors, 
medicinC>s, x-rays, ancl hospital se1Tices were to be lim-
itt'rl to tl10sr "actually" incurred not to exceed $377.50 
I H. 2:3-1). 
\Vithout proof of the value of any loss (including 
1·arning-s) related to future surgery, and in the absence 
of an instruction specifically dealing with the subject 
of future surgery, it is assumed that the jurors, pre-
·'nmahly persons of reasonable intelligence, could not 
fail to understand that no recovery for medical expenses 
iHC'idcnt to surgery could be had. 1° Furthermore, on 
:1ppral, the eourt is "obliged to indulge the assumption" 
1 liat thr jurors followed the instructions as given by the 
('IJlll'l. 11 
( '. Tlic "Moore" Holding Did Not Require the 
f1ial ('1111rl to Gire [11sfrucfion No. 21. 
This c·ourt, in JloorP r. Dc11cer and Rio Grande 
11'1·sten1 R11if1rny Company, 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849, 
'"See: Mazzotta t'. Los Angeles R. Corp., 25 Cal 2d 165, 153 P.2d 338. 
''Moore '" Denver and Rio Grande Western Railway Company, 
·I IJtah ld 255, 292 P.2d 849. 
11 
thP trial court for failing to au instruetio11 
- ' 
n•quest('d hy tiJP defendants, whid1 the qlll'S-
tiou of a disc injury from th<> coHsid<•ratiou of the• jnr:1 
'rlw majorit:v opinion h<·l<l that tht> prnof of th<' di,.;c in_ 
jury was not prohatin>. It is tl1is JH'inciple whieh d1·-
frnse counsel assPrts is applica hle to the ins taut <·asP. 
The plaintiff argues tliat this court did not i11tc11il 
it8 Jloore dc,ci,.;ion to have thl' effect argtwd on appeal 
11y tl1e defendants. In /11 fle Hi!'l1anls Rstate, :i rtal1 
2d 106, 297 P.2d 342, it was argtwd that the tcstimom 
of all exrwrt witness -was so nncPrtain and Yague that 
it should not have heen submitted to the jury. Tlw 
Jfoore case was cited as authority for this propositio11. 
'l'his court, finding the <•Yidt>nce admissible, held this to 
he an erroneous interpretation of the Jl1 oo re holding. 
It stat0d simply that Jf oore held" in tlie 1wrtic11lar co11-
text" that the experts' qnalifying phrases renderrd thi> 
tc>stimony "too insubstantial \\·lien standiHg alone !11 
support the \'erdid. "'" ( pha sis add Pd) 
D. The [;_,'z·ide11ce S11lJ111ifterl lJ.IJ flte Plaintiff uu t/11' 
lss11e of Puf11re Surgery 1cas Probatire. 
Tlw trial court could not condrnle !hat there wci:; 
''Note that the concurring opinion in the Moore case criticized the 
reasoning of the majority, concluding that, 
'". . . instead of succumbing to specious pretexts of ingenious 
counsel to avoid a distasteful result, judicial forthrightness requim 
recognition that the verdict was so excessive that it must have re-
sulted from passion and prejudice, and the granting of a new mal 
on that ground." 
Counsel suggests that the main thrust of the cited portion of the 
concurring opinion refers to the argument that the evidence was nor 
probative, and to the conclusion that failure to give the defendants 1n· 
struction constituted reversible error. The concurring opinion 
prophetically cited the legal "cliche" that "harsh cases make bad law. 
12 
111• nwdir:d (·\·idern·0 produC'ccl hy which the jury could 
i'illd tli:1t "mgery would be requirc>cl. If the evidence 
1rns prnl1;d in', and if it posed an issue for the jury, 
.1"" 'lJ1· prnposPcl instruetio11 was correctly denie(l. 
Tlic• t reati11g physician testified that there was a 
1.-J pL·r c·(·nt chance> that surgery would be required. The 
d<'fcnda11ts' argumc11t, simplified, is that unless there 
is a 1wr ce11t cliancc, the jury could ne\·er find for 
till' proposition by a preponderance of the evidence (R. 
li20-fi26). This, it is argued, is tlw legal effect of the 
l1olding in the Jloorl! casr. The logical c>xtension of the 
dde11dm1ts' argumPnt is that proof of any co11clition, 
liH\·i11g a ehauce for surgery of less than 50 per cent, is 
111)t prohatin>, and is, by means of an instruction, to be 
automatically removed from the considrration of the 
.111r:>. 
'l'he applicatio11 of this formula denies reality. It 
'uggc•sts that a ea1111ot find, or consider, with the 
e1i1 l l)f thc medical testimony and other proof, that which 
i.-; i11 fa<'t trne. That is, that a plaintiff, as a result of 
l1is injuries and of the negligence which caused them 
l1a., n l;) pPr cent, or, as the case may be, a 49 per cent 
d1a11ce of future surgery. 
The ph1illtiff sug1£ests that the correet formula is 
that a j my could find by a preponderance of the ev1-
rl1·11C'l' that therP is a 15 per cent chance of future sur-
:.;1·1')·, and consic1Pr the fad accordingly. This appears 
lo liL' the position taken by the majority of the cases that 
13 
have considered the matter.13 If the court agrees with 
the plaintiff on this point alone, all other considerations 
notwithstanding, the clefondants' argument urn1er Point 
II must fail. The defendants' proposNl instrncti on wa, 
solidly based on the proposition that there was no med-
ical e\-idence presented at the trial upon which a jury 
conld find that surgery would be necessary. Given pro-
bative evidence, upon which a jury could predicate a 
finding, the instruction was clearly incorrect (R. 211). 
Although these com;iderations become less signifi-
cant gin•n the plaintiff's wain·r of any claim for such ' 
damages, and his failure to pro,-e the value of any s11eh 
loss or to pursue the matter in argument, the court pro11-
denied the instruction. 
K The Court's Failure to Giue the Requested In-
sf rucf ion !Jirl Not, !11 A11.11 Ere11t, C'omditutc Prej11rlicial 
Error. 
Analysis of Dr. Soderherg's tt•stimony, and of the 
mediral facts, demonstrates that the amount of tile 
's ,-erdict ,,-as fully justifif'd h>- tlte plaiutiff 's i11-
juries, futurP surgery notwithstanding. The c1efonda11t 
has essentially abandoned on appeal its contention that 
the damages \\'ere exceRsin· although this was asserted, 
without argument, at the hearing on the :\'lotion for a 
Trial (R. 260). It is arguf'd that the amon11t 
of the \'t•rc1ict is "strong irnlieation" that the jury found 
damages for fntun• pain nrnl snffrring associat0d witl1 
''See: Dornberg v. St. Paul City R. Co., 253 Minn 52, 91 NW 178, 
Also: Annotation 69 ALR2d 1271. 
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a Cl'JTiC'al fusion. Nothing, other than the amount of 
thr a ward, is asserted to permit such an inference. As 
rhe :ouri Supreme Court stated in Sang v. St. Louis, 
.::!i2 ;\[o. 454, 171 SW 347, it "would be trifling with 
justice to suppose that the jury allowed anything of 
substance on the issue of future medical services.'' 
!H;mpha sis added). 
In the same Utah rase which confined the Moore 
decision to its own particular facts, 14 the trial court re-
fused to give an instruction to the effect that the bur-
den of showing lack of testamentary capacity was upon 
the contestants in a will contest. That this was the law 
was undisputed. It was indicated on the instruction by 
1 he trial judge that the charge was "given by implica-
tion." This court held on appeal that while it might 
have been desirable to give the requested instruction, 
and would not have been error to do so, failure to do 
so did not justify a reversal. Only when the jury was 
iusufficiently advised of the issues to be determined, 
or C"onfused or misled to the prejudice of the complain-
ing party, did the refusal to give an instruction consti-
tute thP basis for a reversal. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ex-
pressly provides that if there is error, no new trial 
shall be granted or judgment be disturbed, unless re-
fusal to take such action appears "inconsistent with 
justice." Nothing so appears in the instant 
ease. 
''ln Re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542. 
15 
The defowlm1ts' profforred i11structio11 did rnit "]Jl·-
cifi('ally purport to cover damages related to pain ll'"I 
suffering. It was limited by its terms to damages fo 1 
"possihlP future disability" or expenses of "surgienl 
treatment.'"-· Ha<l tlw instruction been given, it would 
havP fur11islwd the jury with no guidance with respect 
to the issue of damage:-: for pain and suffering. 
POINT Ill 
THE TRIAL PROPERLY AP-
PLIED SETTLFJD PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
IN DIRBJCTING THE JURY TO CORRECT 
ITS VERDICT. 
Plaintiff's c·om1sP! argued in condmliug the plai11-
t iff 's en:-;(_• that the plaintiff had expemlPd $377.:iO for 
medical expenses, $65.00 for air fare to Norfolk, Vir-
guua, and that he had lost $1,255.00 iu earnings as a 
result of his injuries (R. 490-491). The total of the 
above items was Counsel made a per diem 
argume11t with respect to damages for pain and suf-
fering ( R.492-494). The court, without discussion of 
air fan• and lost earnings, had instructed the jury that 
the total amount of special damages should 11ot execcrl 
the sum of $31/JiO, the amount of the medical special.-< 
(R 234). 
TliP jury retumed with a total ,·enliet of $11,700.00, 
$1,700.00 of wliieh was eharackriz<•d a:-: gp11eral <lam-
ag<·s am! $10,000.00 of \Yhich was d1araetcrized as :oqw-
1 '·This is also the interpretation earlier placed on the instruction b) 
defense counsel (R. 526). 
16 
1 ta! 'la rnages ( R. 255-A). During a conference in ch am-
'." r' 11 1 di:·wnss the error, plaintiff's counsel called to 
:he attentio11 of the trial court the fact that the air fare, 
the nwdical expenses, and the lost earnings totalled 
roughly $1,700.00 (R. 504). Counsel also, before the re-
turn of the jury, called to the court's attention the fact 
that the jury had inadvertently inserted the special dam-
age item in the general damage section of the verdict 
form all(] vice \·ersa (R. 509).iu 
A the conference in chambers, the court asked 
the jury to return to the jury room and reconsider its 
\"Prdid in light of the court's earlier instructions, par-
tieularly those haYing reference to the issue of damages 
(H. 508). 
The jury, following the court's advice, returned to 
the jury room, discussed the matter and corrected the 
\'crdict to read $377.50 special damages and $11,332.50 
1;r1wrnl damages. The amount of the verdict, $11,700.00, 
n·mainecl constant. 
The defendants' .Jlotio11 for a Xew Trial was i>ri-
marily hased upon the alleged irregularity of the pro-
c«•edi11gs as abon described (R. 259). The transcript 
of tltt• df'f<•nclants' argument on its .Jlotion for a New 
Trinl reflects the following interchange: 
COURT: "What is your comment on Rule 47R 
and Jorgensen versus Gonzales? \Yha t have you 
got to say about about those two items?" 
1 '·See also counsel's comments in the Record at 504. 
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MR. WADSWORTH: "I don't know. I'd have 
to read them." (R. 532) 
The Judge then concluded that Jorgensen o. Gon-
zales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 383 P.2d 934 (1963), with rule 
47(r) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was "de-
eisive" of the isslws raised h>· the defendants' motion 
(R. 533). 
Despite the especial significance attached to the 
Gonzales case by the trial court, and to Rule 47(r), these 
authorities han heen again ignored hy the defenda11(:.; 
on appeal." 
Rule 47 ( r) indicates: 
"Correction of Verdict. If the verdict ren-
dered is informal or insufficient, it may be cor-
rected by the jury under the ad,·ice of the court, 
or the jury may he sent out again.'' 
.!orgc11se11 r. Gonzales, supra, is dispositin' of tlw j,. 
sues raised by Point III of th0 appellant's hrief, both 
as goyerning precedent and as a logical proposition. 
In Gonzales, an automobile collision case, the jury re-
turned a verdict of $368.49 special damages and $1,131.51 
general damages. The odcl amounts of the damages 
causecl the court to question the jury foreman about the 
possibility of a quotient 01· chance verdict. Discussion 
disclosed that the jury had considered the plaintiff', 
tra,·el expense from California to Utah as an item of 
general damage. The defendant asserted and the plain-
17See Appellants Brief, page 17. Appellant refers to Rule 47(r) and 
to State v. Gonzales without analysis, except to say chat they served as 
authorization for the trial judge's decision to direct the jury to reconvene. 
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tiff conceded that this was incorrect. The court directed 
the ju "Y to go out and reconsider its verdict. After re-
·.·on»iderntion, the jury returned with a second corrected 
renlict of $368.49 special damages and $1,200.00 gen-
<·ral damages. Note that, unlike the instant case, the 
amount of the total verdict was increased adversely to 
the interest of the defendant-appellant. 
This court, in referring to Rule 47 ( r) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, concluded that, 
''The general and well-established rule is 
that so long as the jury is functioning as such in 
the course of a trial and until it is discharged, 
it is subject to directions and instructions from 
the court to the end that the issues be fully tried, 
deliberated upon, and a correct verdict rendered. 
And where it is apparent that there is some 
patent error in connection with the verdict, the 
court may of course call the matter to their at-
tention and direct them to redeliberate. In that 
regard it has been held, sensibly and properly, 
that where an amount is erroneously included 
the court may direct the jury to retire and cor-
rect it. The trial court appears to have acted 
not only within its prerogative but properly and 
discreetly in handling the situation.'' 
The principle of the Gonzales case is widespread. 
[t i8 applicable when a verdict is "informal," "insen-
sihl0,'' "repugnant," "not responsive to the issues sub-
mitted,'' or ''in disregard of the instructions of the 
rourt. '' Although, counsel asserts, none of these ele-
mrnts were present in the instant case, the practice of 
JlPrmitting a jury to reconvene to reconsider is merely 
an application of the "settled rule" that "until the 
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verdict has been recorded, or the jury have been dis-
charged as unable to agree, their connection with thP 
case has not come to an end." Bla,in c. Yor:key, 117 Col(), 
20, 18-1- P.2<l 1915. See also: Bortek u. Pliilarlelphia 
Rapid Tnmsit Co., 13 A 856, Baldwin c. Eruing, 69 Idaho 
17G, 204 P.2d 430, Sparks r. Berntsen, 19 Cal.2d 308, 
121 P.2d -1:07, Holloicay r. Ecans, 33 N.M. 601, 238 P.2rl 
457, 8a.1·ko r. Brookl.1;11 a11d Queens Transit Corp., 1 
489, 1661\Iisc 84. 
'flw ddem1ant makes rnneh of tlw point that tl11, 
jury did not redeliberate, that it merely retired, ma<le 
a mathematical calculation and returned. Nothing i11 
th0 record substantiates sneh a conclusion, other than 
the fact that the second retirement "·as brief. How brief, 
is diffienlt to determine from the record which is am· 
Lignous and confus0d on the point." Cases such as thosr 
citPd in the appellants' brief"' which inn>ln• 
wl1ich stubbornly refuse to follow tlw instructions of 
the court on matters invoking substantive change, are 
markedly nuhelpful when consi(1ering corrections invoh·-
ing matters of form. 
A jury nrdict that, "\Ye• fiml for the plaintiff, JJO 
cause of action," is easily corrected. It requires no suh-
stantial r<>eonsideration. To gauge the validity of the 
1 'Note that the record, p. 508, indicates that the court returned and 
requested the jury to reconsider its verdict at p.m. and the record, 
p. 510, indicates that the jury returned with th€ corrected verdict at 4:41 
p.m. 
'"See especially Feruzza v. City of Pittsburgh, 394 Pa. 70, 145 A.2d 
706, where the jury, without adequate deliberation, defied the judge, 
adding attorney fees, court costs, and additional damages by "indirec-
tion," correctly called by the court "capricious'" and ··unjustifiable." 
111rtP< 'ion rn terms of the time required to effect it, 
" . .uld rdeh credulity. ·when a jury considers the ele-
m<'llts of damage eorrectly, even though confusing such 
<·011erpts as general and special damages and reflecting 
thc>m i11eorrectly as to form on the verdict, a mere me-
<'hanie:d ehangp or mathematical calculation is indicated. 
Restating the languagp of the Gonza,les case, '' ... where 
an amount is rrroneously included the court may direct 
the jury to rPtire and correct it.'' 
Furthermore, Rule 47 ( r) provides that an informal 
or i11snfficiPnt verdict "may be corrected by the jury 
11111/er the arfrice of the court, or the jury may be sent 
olff urmi11." (Emphasis added). The rule then provides, 
alternatively, that such matters may be resolved and 
ne(·essary corrections made by a jury reconvened at 
lht> direction of the court, or by a jury operating in open 
<·ourt with the judge's assistance, without redeliberation. 
POINT IV 
THE PROCEDURES AT AND BEFORE 
THE HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' MO-
'l'TON FOR A NEW TRIAL WERE PROPER 
A N"D DID NOT PREJUDICE THE DEFEND-
ANTS. 
The defendants eo11teJl(l that plaintiff's eounsel 
adecl improp<1 rly by submitting affidavits of jurors to 
flH• eon rt in a<h·ai1ce of the hearing on defendants' Mo-
tion for a New Trial. The questioned documents are in-
clu<led in the record on appeal (R. 261-266). It is as-
·'erted that the affidavits should have been submitted 
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as exhibits to the plaintiff's rebuttal argument to t!iP 
defendants' l\Iotion for a N cw Trial. This woulfl km· 
permitted, counsel reasons, the court to have rulrd 
the issu<> of admissibility before the offending docu 
ments were ma<le a part of the record. The advance 
submission of the affidavits is alleged to have been 
"highly improper" and possibly prejudicial to the de. 
fendants' position with respect to the l\Iotion for a New 
'!'rial. 
In providing counsel and the court with the pro 
l'oscd :1ffidaYits in ach·ance of the hearing, tlw plai11tiff 
was complying with the specific provisions of Rule 59(r) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule require, 
the moving party on a Motion for New Trial hase<l 
upon suhdiYisions 1 through 4 of RulP 59 to support tli1· 
motion hy affithn-it."" It further rPquires that thr op-
posing party has 10 clays, after service of the moYing 
party's motion, within which to serve opposing affida-
Yits. Ha<l plaintiff's counsel \rnitPd until the morning 
of the hearing to produce the proposed affidavits, it is 
most likely that the court would have rejected them, 
not on their merits as it did, hut on technical grounds, 
011 defendants' motion, on the theor>· that they \\'PJ'(' 
1rntimPI:· aml took tlie cle>fcndants by snrprisP. 
A careful reading- of the record indieatcs that no 
q ne>stion of the impropriety of counsel was raised b;· 
the defrmlants with the trial court whc!l tl1c• afficla1·it:-:' 
admissibility was discussed (R. 516-517). ThP court 
""Although the Defendants' motion, based in large part on Rule 
59(a)(l), was unsupported. 
:·01wlude<l that the affidavits were filed to impeach the 
",·;-diet of the jury (R. 517), that such use was not per-
hy law (R. 517), and that it was not going to con-
"irler thrm (R. 516). 
It is presumed on appeal that the court disregarded 
improperly admitted evidence in arriving at its decision. 
Re /Janiels Estate, 185 Oreg. 642, 205 P.2d 167. This 
court has recited frequently the proposition that a trial 
judge hearing a case without a jury is assumed to have 
;;nperior knowledge as to the competency of and the 
effect to be given evidence. Super Tire Market, Inc. v. 
Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132. It is presumed 
that the trial judge considered only the part of the testi-
which was material, competent and relevant. Big 
eottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Ka;y, 108 Utah 110, 157 
P.2d 795. 
X ote that the presumption that the trial court can 
"separate the wheat from the chaff" is most often in-
dulged in situations where evidence is admitted and the 
reeonl is silent as to the basis for the judge's decision. 
I11 tl1e instant case, it is unnecessary to speculate as to 
the influence of the affidavits on the final decision. The 
.imlgP was explicit, saying bluntly with respect to the 
1locumrnts, "I'm not going to consider them." (R. 516). 
It is difficult to conceive, under such circumstances, 
that the affidavits had any prejudicial effect, or that 
the attempt to use them constituted harmful error. The 
ap1wlla11ts have not attempted to articulate the basi,; 
for a daim of prejudice or to explain in what way the 
rontPnts of the affidavits were offensive. The whole 
matter is best considered as involving nothing more 
than a question of the admissibility of evidence,21 evi. i 
deuce which was rejected by the court and whie,11 ha;.; w. 
bearing on its decision."" 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in grant. 
ing Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial at the conclusion 
of the first trial. Further, a careful reading of the rec. 
ord of the second trial dispels the notion that any error 
was committed which would justify a reversal of the 
judgment of the trial court. The judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
" 1 It would be incorrect to characterize the affidavits as an effort to 
"impeach" or "question" the verdict of the jury, something the plaintiff 
had no desire to do. It is possible, however, that insofar as they at· 
tempted to show the grounds for the verdict and the reasoning process 
of the jury, they were still inadmissible under the rule of Wheat r. 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railway Company, 120 Utah 418, 250 
P.2d 932. However, as an evidential matter, any potential "mischief' 
from such a "post mortem" was effectively foreclosed by the refusal ot 
the trial court to consider the documents. 
""The trial judge, as previously indicated, called Rule 47(r) and 
State v. Gonzales, supra, "decisive" of the issues involved on the Mouon 
for a New Trial. 
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